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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RULON T. JEFFS and J. MARION
HAMMON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
Case
No. 8637

VS.

CITIZENS FINANCE COMPANY,
a corporation
Defendant and Appellant

Brief· of Plaintiffs and Respondents

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced on the 8th day of September,
1955, by the plaintiff-respondents, Rulon T. Jeffs and J.
Marion Hammon, against the defendant-appellant, Citizens
Finance Company, to quiet title to the premises referred to
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Betsy Lee, as
vendor, and Dale E. Watson and Laura Dean Watson, his
wife, as purchasers.
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The defendant-appellant filed an answer and counterclaim and the matter came on for pre-trial conference, at which
time the trial court fixed the 'matter of law to be considered
at the trial.
The tnatter was heard by the court on the 14th day of
December, 1956, and the court ruled that plaintiff-respondents
were entitled to an order quieting title to the premises, the
defendant-appellant having failed to present any evidence.
On the 4th day of January, 1957, judgment was duly
entered in favor of the plaintiff-respondents, and thereafter,
the defendant~appellant served and filed notice of appeal and
the cause is now before the court for review.
The action arose from certain transactions hereinafter
briefly set forth.
On the 9th day of June, 1952, Betsy Lee, a widO'\Y, by a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, sold certain real property located
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to Dale E. Watson and
Laura Dean Watson, his wife.
On the 20th day of December, 1952, the Watsons assigned
their equity in the contract to Citizens Finance Company, the
defendant-appellant, for the purpose of securing a loan evidenced by a promissory note. The assignment '\\'as recorded on
the 23rd day of December, 1952.
On the 9th day of March, 195~, Betsy Lee assigned all
her right, title and interest in and to the contract, and conveyed the real property by \\';.trranty deed to Rulon T. Jeffs,
{)ne of the plaintiff-respondents.
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The Watsons, being delinquent in the payments due under
the contract, were served with notice of forfeiture on the 28th
day of May, 1954, and thereafter, on June 22, 1954, were
served with notice to quit. On the 14th day of July, 1954, t'he
plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs, filed an unlawful detainer action
against the Watsons, and on the 20th day of August, 1954,
judgment was entered against the W atsons, which judgment
provided for the forfeiture of the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into on the 9th day of June, 1952, for writ of
restitution, and for the sum of $5 50.00 accrued back payments.
Thereafter, the property was repossessed by the plaintiffrespondent, Jeffs, who subsequently, by warranty deed, conveyed the property to J. Marion Hammon, the other plaintiffrespondent herein.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The defendant-appellant was afforded an opportunity

by the trial court to assert its rights in and to the property, the
subject matter of this litigation, and the defendant-appellant,
by not offering evidence, refused to assert its rights and so
waived any rights it may have had.
2. A person not in possession of property, said property

being the subject matter of an unlawful detainer action, is not
entitled to notice of the action.
3. The court is empowered to declare a forfeiture of a
Uniform Real Estate Contract by judgment in an unlawful
,)
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detainer action if said contract is the agreement under which
t'he property is being held by the defendant.
4. The defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company,
as assignee of the W atsons' interest, did not give sufficient
notice of the assignment so as to put the vendor of the property,
Betsy Lee, or her assignee, the plaintiff-respondent Jeffs, on
the duty of notice of defendant-appellant's assignment. The
iailure of the defendant-appellant to give notice constitutes
an estoppel to assert a claim of lack of notice.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED
AN OPPORTUNITY BY THE TRIAL COURT TO ASSERT
ITS RIGHTS IN AND TO THE PROPERTY, THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS LITIGATION, AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, BY NOT OFFERING EVIDENCE, REFUSED TO ASSERT ITS RIGHTS AND SO
WAIVED ANY RIGHTS IT MAY HAVE HAD.
The trial court ruled that the defendant-appellant, Citizens
Finance Company, was entitled to assert what claims it had
as to the property in question and what issues it could have
raised at the trial on the unlawful detainer action, had it been
notified by the plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs, at the time of the
~Let ion.

nThe C~ourt: tSo this record n1ay state the full truth,
I held as a n1atter of law the only issue to be tried here
\\'aS ,,··hat this defendant could have raised at the
0
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former trial had he been given notice and the only
thing then he could have shown was whether or not
there was an equity at that time in this property.' ''
Record, pp. 32, 33, Lines 29 to 2
The defendant-appellant was entitled to bring an action
at any time against the plaintiff-respondents, Jeffs and Hamn1on, to have its equity in the property determined. Malmberg
v. Baugh, 218 P. 975; Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446. The
Utah Supreme Court, in Williams vs. Nelson, 237 P. 217,
said:
HAs a matter of course, in t'his jurisdiction the tenant
may at any time institute an action in a court of equity
to determine his rights to the premises in question."
This case was cited with approval in the Utah case of
Dunbar v. Hansen, 250 P. 982. Chief Justice Moffat, in the
concuring opinion in Christy v. Guild, 121 P.2d 401, said:
HI concur with the understanding that the unlawful
detainer action does not cut off the right of the purchaser to bring suit to have equities determined if he
claims equities in his favor."
As the assignee, the defendant-appellant could have
brought this action. However, the defendant-appellant did not
bring an action to have its equities, if any, determined.
The plaintiff-respondents, Jeffs and Hammon, brought the
action to quiet title under Section 78-40-1, Utah Code Anno,
195 3, which provides:
((Action to determine adverse claim to propertyAuthorized.-An action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property or an interest or claim to personal property
.-

'
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adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such
adverse claim."

By bringing this action, plaintiff-respondents gave the
defendant-appellant the opportunity to assert its claims, if any,
and to show any equity that the Watsons may have had to the
property. However, t'he defendant-appellant refused to go for'Hard and assert any equity that it might have had under the
assignment of the real estate contract.
The trial court ruled:
((At this time I have accorded the defendant the right
to show what that equity was and if there was an equity
there, or a lien thereon, and you refuse to go on and
offer proof."
Record, p. 33, Lines 3 to 6
The defendant-appellant claims that it did not have sufficent time or information to proceed, and that its rights had
been denied. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with regards
to depositions and discovery, under Rules 26 through 37,
inclusive, afforded the defendant-appellant ample procedural
methods of eliciting all the information that it needed. The
record discloses that the defendant-appellant never filed a
motion for an extension of time within which to prepare its
evidence, nor made any demands for discovery under the Rules
of Civil Procedure. By defendant-appellant's failure to go
forward and offer evidence as to its equity in the property,
the trial court \vas justified in granting to the plaintiff-re~:pondents a judgrnent quieting title to the property.

s
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POINT TWO
A PERSON NOT IN POSSESSION OF PROPERTY,
SAID PROPERTY BEING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION, IS NOT ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF THE ACTION.
Under the Utah law dealing with unlawful detainer
actions, the statutes specifically provide that the only necessary
party defendants to the action are the person or persons who
are in possession of the property at the time of the commencement of the action.
UNo person other than the tenant of the premises,
and subtenant if there is one in the actual operation
of the premises w'hen the action is commenced, need
be made a party defendant in the proceeding, . . . "
Sec. 78-36-7, Utah Code Anno., 1953
In cases where there is a real estate contract involved in
the unlawful detainer action, this Court has held that:
((In this jurisdiction, it appears to be the common
practice, under such a contract" (real estate) ((as is
here involved, to bring an unlawful detainer action
against a defaulting vendee."
Christy v. Guild, (1942) Utah 121 P.2d 401
In Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d 748,
the Supreme Court specifically held that an action of unlawful
detainer was proper where the agreement under which the
property was being conveyed was a ((Uniform Real Estate
Contract.''
In the unlawful detainer action, the plaintiff-respondent,
Jeffs, caused to be served upon the Watsons a notice of forD
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feiture and a notice to quit. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3, File
# 42450, Salt Lake City Court). These notices were sufficient
under the laws of Utah and judgment was duly entered by the
City Court.
As the Utah law specifically holds that only those in possession are entitled to notice, the plaintiff-respondents contend
that under no theory was the defendant-appellant entitled to
notice of this unlawful detainer action, but that if the defendant-appellant were entitled to any notice, that the duty of
giving such notice would have been that of the Watsons and
not of the plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs.

POINT THREE
THE COURT IS EMPOWERED TO DECLARE A FORFEITURE OF A UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
BY JUDGMENT IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION IF SAID CONTRACT IS THE AGREEMENT UNDER
WHICH THE PROPERTY IS BEING HELD BY THE
DEFENDANT.
Under the Utah law dealing with unlawful detainer
actions, the statutes specifically provide that the judgment
rendered by the court n1ay declare the forfeiture of the agreernent under which the person or persons in possession of the
property rely for their right of possession.
" ... and if the proceeding is for unla\\'ful detainer
after neglect or failure to perfonn any condition or
L'ovenant of the lease or agreen1ent under Y:hich the
10
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property is held, . . . the judgment shall also declare
the forfeiture of such lease or agreement."
Sec. 78-36-10, Utah Code Anno., 195 3
The plaintiff-respondents contend that as the court is
~pecifically empowered to declare a forfeiture of an agreement
under which property is held, and that, as shown by Point
Two of this brief, no notice need be given to any person or
persons other than those who are in actual possession of the
property, the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by
the Watsons on the 9th day of June, 1952, was duly forfeited
as provided for by the Utah statutes.
The defendant-appellant, in its brief, contends t'hat the
contract was not forfeited, because of the lack of notice to it.
However, as hereinabove stated, it was not entitled to notice.

POINT FOUR
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, CITIZENS FINANCE
COMPANY, AS ASSIGNEE OF THE W ATSONS' INTEREST, DID NOT GIVE SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE
l\SSIGNMENT SO AS TO PUT THE VENDOR OF THE
PROPERTY, BETSY LEE, OR HER ASSIGNEE, THE
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT JEFFS, ON THE DUTY OF
NOTICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT.
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO
GIVE NOTICE CONSTITUTES AN ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT
A CLAIM OF LACK OF NOTICE.
The defendant-respondent, Citizens Finance Company,
assumed only the beneficial interest that the Watsons had in
11
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their contract. It did not assume any of the burdens and liabilities. The purpose of the assignment was not to take over
possession or to assume the payment of the monthly payments,
but as security for the repayment of a loan made by it to the
Watsons.
(This assignment is given for the purpose of securing prompt payment of a certain promissory note dated
Dec. 20, 1952, executed by the undersigned in favor
of Citizens Finance Co. in the sum of $1032.00."
c

Assignment, Def's Ex. No. 2
(We took an assignment of their equity in a real
estate contract covering a home they were purchasing
at 1215 East 33rd South . . . We realize that our
security is applicable only to the equity the Watsons
had in the property.''
t

Letter, Citizens Finance Co. toR. T. Jeffs, dtd March
5, 1955, PI's Ex. No. 5
we acted in good faith and took an assignment
of beneficial interest in this contract.''
t

c • • •

Letter, Citizens Finance to Cotro-Manes, dtd April
9, 1955, PI's Ex. No. 4
The defendant-appellant admits that it gave no notice of
the assignn1ent between t'he Watsons and itself to the vendor,
Betsy Lee, except by constructive notice by the recordation
of the assigntnent.
(The Court: c • • • it is agreed now that no notice
\vas ever given by this defendant of the assignment
\V hich it had except such constructive notice as may
ber, iven by the filing and recording of the same?'
lvt r:. Parkinson: cyes.' "
t

t •

Record, P.

30~

lines 25 to 29

)~
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The recording of the assignment was not valid and sufficient notice to the vendor of the property. In 66 Corpus Juris
1079, Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 868, it is said:
((Under general rules, unless notice of an assignment by the purchaser is given the vendor he is not
affected by it. The notice must be sufficient."
Under the Utah statutes dealing with the assignment of
a mortgage, the statutes hold that unless actual notice is given
to the mortgagor, the recording of the assignment is not sufficient notice to him.
It follows that as Betsy Lee, the vendor of the property,
did not have notice of the assignment, had she commenced
the action for unlawful detainer against the Watsons herself,
under no theory or practice of the law would she have had
to give notice to the Citizens Finance Company. The general
rule is that there must be actual notice of assignment to the
vendor. The Citizens Finance Company, in becoming the assignee of ~he Watsons, assumed the position of the W atsons,
and was subject to all the defenses and equities of the vendor,
Betsy Lee.
((An assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action
ordinarily, however, acquires no greater right than was
possessed by his assignor, but simply stands in the
shoes of fhe latter."
4 Am Jur 304, Assignments, Sec. 95
. It is held that an assignee of a purchaser of
real estate takes subject to all the rights of the vendor
under the original contract of sale, including all defenses thereto availabe to the vendor."
55 Am Jur 836, Vendor and Purchaser, Sec 422

1')

,_)
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As the defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company,
did not give actual notice to the vendor, Betsy Lee, it could
not have enforced the contract against Betsy Lee.
C<Ordinariy, the obligations arising out a contract
are due only to those with whom it is made; a contract
cannot be enforced by a person who is not a party to
it or in privity with it."
12 Am Jur 818, Contracts, Sec. 273

(<It is frequently stated that in order to enable a
person to enforce an obligation there must exist between him and the obligee what is known in law as
privity.''
12 Am Jur 819, Contracts, Sec 273
As the defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company,
did not give notice of the assignment to Betsy Lee, there was
no privity between them, and certainly no novation of the
contract. It follows that as there was no privity between Gtizens
Finance Company and Betsy Lee, there can be no privity between Citizens Finance Company and Betsy Lee's assignee,
the plaintiff-respondent, Jeffs.
The facts in this case show without doubt that fuere was
privity between Betsy Lee and Rulon T. Jeffs, and likewise
there was privity between Citizens Finance Company and the
W atsons. The failure of the defendant-appellant, Gtizens
Finance Company, to give notice to Betsy Lee of its assigni nent creates an estoppel between it and Betsy Lee, whereby
the defendant-appellant is barred or estopped from asserting
:1ny rights or equities against Betsy Lee. As there is privity
hct\vccn Betsy Lee and the plaintiff-respondent. Jefis, the
defendant-appellant, Citizens Finance Company, is estopped

1-t
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from asserting any claim against Jeffs on the same theory as it
is estopped from asserting any claim against Betsy Lee.
((It is also a well recognized rule that where an
estoppel is operative as between the original parties
to the transaction, it is aso effective as to their privies
in contract . . . ''
Marion Cortgage Co. v. Grennan, 143 So 761, 87
ALR 1492
((When a contract of sale has been assigned, the vendor not being a party to the assignment, no duty
devolves on the vendor to hunt up the assignee to
tender performance; it is sufficient if performance
is tendered to the original vendee; and it is the duty
of the assignee to make a tender of the money and
demand a deed at or within the time designated in the
contract, if time is of the essense of the agreement, or
within a reasonable period if time is not material, and,
if assignee fails to do so, the vendor, who has once
tendered performance to his vendee that has remained,
unaccepted, may treat the contract as abandoned, so
as to become entitled to have evidence of it removed
from the public records as a cloud on title.'' Citing 1
Warvell on Vendors ( 2d Ed.), Sec. 66, p. 83; Corbus
vs. Teed, 69 Ill. 205."
Pierce & Stevenson v. Jones, 147 So. 842, 88 ALR 192

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff-respondents contend that the trial court
ruled properly in permitting the defendant-appellant to assert
what equities it 'had in the property at the time of the trial
of the quiet title action. This ruling of the trial court is in
conformity with the holding of the Supreme Court in the case

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of Christy v. Guild, and the earlier cases of Williams v. Nelson
and Dunbar v. Hansen. The trial court's ruling is also in conforn1ity with the intent of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
eliminate needless litigation and to consolidate as many causes
of action between the same parties in one trial as possible.
The plaintiff-respondents contend, however, that the
defendant-appellant was not entitled to any notice of t'he
unlawful detainer action on two theories, first, that the unlawful detainer statutes as cited above in Point Two and Point
Three exclude the necessity of notice to persons not in possession; and, secondly, that the defendant-appellant's failure
to provide notice to the vendor of its assignment establishes
an estoppel whereby any assignee of the vendor is not charged
with notice of the assignment regardless of the recordation.
The plaintiff-respondents further contend that even if
the defendant-appellant had been entitled to notice, t'hat as
there was no privity of contract between it and the vendor,
the defendant-appellant was not entitled to assert any of the
rights under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Respectfully submitted,
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
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